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Presenting Arguments as Fictive Dialogue
Paul Piwek1
Abstract. Presentation of an argument can take many different
forms ranging from a monologue to advanced graphics and diagrams.
This paper investigates the presentation of one or more arguments in
the form of a fictive dialogue. This technique was already employed
by Plato, who used fictive conversations between Socrates and his
contemporaries to put his arguments forward. Ever since, there have
been influential authors – including Desiderius Erasmus, Sir Thomas
More and Mark Twain – that have used dialogue in this way. In this
paper, we define the notion of a fictive dialogue, motivate it is as
a topic for investigation, and present a qualitative and quantitative
study of five fictive dialogues by well-known authors. We conclude
by indicating how our preliminary and ongoing investigations may
inform the development of systems that automatically generate argu-
mentative fictive dialogue.
1 INTRODUCTION
Whereas traditional deductive logic focuses on arguments as formal
structures in which each step towards the conclusion builds on the
preceding steps, naturally occurring argument often involves multi-
ple perspectives, opinions and claims that are in competition with
each other. For students of argumentation theory, the dialectical un-
derpinning of argument has become a common place, partly as a re-
sult of the pioneering work by Hamblin [4]. Legal reasoning, with
its arguments and counterarguments, provides a good example of
a domain where traditional deductive methods are inadequate, be-
cause they do not capture the dialectical dimension (e.g., [10]). Also,
researchers in Natural Language Generation (NLG) have proposed
that rhetorical structures underlying argument in monologue form
can be derived from the speaker’s internal dialogue (e.g., [5]). Given
the central role that dialogue plays in the understanding of argument,
we believe that automated presentation of arguments as dialogue is a
fruitful area of research.
Automated presentation of arguments as dialogue is an NLG task:
given a representation of an argument (which could range from for-
mulae in a logical calculus to natural language text), the aim is to
automatically transform this representation to a dialogue presenta-
tion between two or more interlocutors. Apart from the dialectical
underpinnings of argument, there are further reasons why dialogue is
an attractive presentation medium. According to a number of empir-
ical studies, for educational and persuasive purposes, presentation in
dialogue form is more effective than monologue; for example:
• Craig et al. [2] found that dialogue stimulates students to write
more in a free recall test and ask twice as many deep-level rea-
soning questions in a subsequent tutor-guided task on a different
topic,
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• Lee et al. [7] report that there is more discussion between students
and less banter after watching a dialogue,
• Cox et al. [1] established that student learning is at least as good
as with monologue, and
• Suzuki and Yamada [13], comparing dialogue between two life-
like characters – a persuader and a persuadee agent in an on-
line shopping scenario – with monologue, found that dialogue is
more effective as a means for persuasion; in particular, dialogue
increased the purchase likelihood when compared to monologue.
Additionally, presenting information in the form of a dialogue is a
popular means for engaging and entertaining an audience, as wit-
nessed by the widespread use of dialogue in commercials, news bul-
letins (between presenters), educational entertainment, and games.
From an application-driven point of view, dialogue is eminently suit-
able for multimodal presentations involving two or more lifelike
computer-animated characters [11].
In the remainder of this paper, we first provide a more precise
characterization of the notion of a fictive dialogue. We then look at
five instances of professionally authored fictive dialogue. Finally, we
try to extract some lessons from the information gleaned from these
human-authored dialogues for the automatic generation of such dia-
logues.
2 FICTIVE DIALOGUE
The term fictive dialogue is ambiguous: it can refer to both an ob-
ject or an event. We make the two senses explicit by distinguishing
between fictive dialogueo and fictive dialoguee:
• A fictive dialogueo is a script, i.e., the text of a dialogue that was
written by one or more authors.
• A fictive dialoguee is a performance by two or more actors who
create the impression of being engaged a dialogue.
Often a fictive dialoguee is performed by actors on the basis of
script (a fictive dialogueo), though actors may also improvise a fictive
dialoguee on the spot. A fictive dialoguee does not involve real com-
munication between the actors, rather the actors aim to create the im-
pression in the audience that they are communicating and thus their
verbal behaviour is intended primarily for the audience rather than
each other. Similarly, fictive dialogueo is not a record of real com-
munication, but rather an artefact created by its authors.2 Despite this
absence of communication ‘within’ fictive dialogue, at another level
it does, however, involve a communicative act. A fictive dialogue can
be viewed as a communicative act that the originator (whether it be
an author or actors in case of an improvised dialogue) directs at the
2 Though intermediate cases exist: if an author edits the transcript of a real
dialogue in order to incorporate it in, for example, a radio play, the resulting
script occupies the space somewhere in between a fictive dialogueo and a
transcript.
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readers or audience. At this level a genuine communicative act does
take place. Figure 1, shows diagrammatically how a fictive dialogue
created by an author involves both real and feigned communication.
audience/readers
performance by actors creating















Figure 1. Real and feigned communication in fictive dialogue
As with monologue, the communicative acts that are performed
through a fictive dialogue can be grouped into different types. A main
distinction is that between dramatic dialogue, where the purpose is to
tell a story, and expository or information-delivering dialogue, where
the purpose is to convey information to the audience. Argumentative
fictive dialogue has as its primary purpose the transfer of informa-
tion, an argument. However, dramatic elements are often introduced
to convey an argument more vividly. Consider, for example, the fol-
lowing argument:
(1) It is impossible to form any opinion spontaneously different
from the one that one actually forms. It is formed automatically
and instantly, without the person being able to control it. For sup-
pose you try to change your opinion by reflecting upon it, you will
find that it is not possible to change the opinion that way. The only
way it can change is through outside influences.
The argument conveyed by this short text can be presented in the
form of a fictive dialogue. This is exactly what Mark Twain does in
his dialogue titled What is Man?, which we examine in Section 3.
Below, Y.M. stands for Young Man and O.M. stands for Old man.
(2) Y.M. This is too much. You think I could have formed no
opinion but that one?
O.M. Spontaneously? No. And you did not form that one;
your machinery did it for you—automatically and
instantly, without reflection or the need of it.
Y.M. Suppose I had reflected? How then?
O.M. Suppose you try?
Y.M. (After a quarter of an hour.) I have reflected.




Y.M. No. It remains the same; it is impossible
to change it.
O.M. I am sorry, but you see, yourself, that your
mind is merely a machine, nothing more. You have no
command over it, it has no command over itself—
it is worked solely from the outside. That is the law
of its make; it is the law of all machines.
Note that Twain mixes some drama into the argument to liven it up:
he carefully creates a climax by spreading the ‘experiment’, from its
initiation to its conclusion, out over several turns – e.g., the outcome
of the experiment takes four turns: ‘You mean you have tried [...].
Yes. With success? No.’. Bearing this in mind, the emphasis in this
paper is on expository dialogue: argumentative fictive dialogue is pri-
marily a means for information delivery; the purpose is to present
the audience/readership with an argument. Whereas dramatic dia-
logue has been the subject of a number of academic studies (e.g.,
[6]) and popular guides on script writing (e.g., [3]), to our knowl-
edge, no work has been undertaken on expository dialogue in general
and argumentative fictive dialogue.3 In the next section, we make a
beginning with addressing this gap by analysing five dialogues along
a number of dimensions.
3 FIVE DIALOGUES
In order to make a beginning with examing the genre of argumenta-
tive fictive dialogue, we selected five dialogues that span the entire
period from Plato’s original dialogues to the 20th century:
1. Plato (c. 387-380 B.C.) Meno.4
2. Desiderius Erasmus (1523; English translation of 1557). A Merry
Dialogue Declaringe the Properties of Shrowde Shrews and Hon-
est Wives.5
3. Mark Twain (1906). What is man?6
4. David and Stephanie Lewis (1970). Holes.7
5. Raymond M. Smullyan (1977). Is God a Taoist?8
Our aim is to raise a number of qualitative questions that provide us
with more insight into human-authored fictive dialogues:
• What is the nature of the argument: is it adversarial or coopera-
tive?
• What are the roles played by the interlocutors?
• Do the dialogues have a dramatic as well as an expository ele-
ment?
At the same time, we aim to collect quantitative information on the
dialogues, and determine whether there are any meaningful relations
between the qualitative and quantitative characterizations. Note that
for the first two dialogues, the quantitative information only approx-
imates that of the original dialogues, since we used translations. The
quantitative measures that we looked into are:
• How many roles are there in each of the dialogues?
• How many turns does each interlocutor have?
• What is the distribution of the length of turns among the interlocu-
tors?
Before we look at each of the dialogues separately, let us first present
their profile regarding the total number of turns that each involves
and the distribution of turns among interlocutors. As can be seen
from Figure 2, the shortest dialogue in our set consists of just 87
turns, whereas the longest one takes no less than almost a tenfold of
that: 817 turns.
3 Of course, for example, Plato’s dialogues have been studied by philoso-
phers, but primarily to uncover Plato’s doctrines, rather than qualitative and






7 Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 48, No. 2; August, 1970
8 Source: The Tao is Silent, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
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Figure 2. Number of turns in each of the five dialogues by Plato, Erasmus,
Twain, Lewis and Lewis, and Smullyan
Generally, interlocutors split the number of turns equally among
each other as a result of alternating turns: in Twain’s dialogue it is
407:411, Erasmus’s dialogue has 56:56, Lewis and Lewis’s dialogue
has 43:45, and Smullyan’s dialogue has 108:112. The small differ-
ences arise because the dialogues are typically split into a number
of parts. For each part, the interlocutors will either have exactly the
same number of turns,ABAB . . . AB, or one interlocutors will have
one more turn than the other, ABAB . . . ABA. The only apparent
divergence from this pattern occurs in Plato’s dialogue, see Figure 3.
Figure 3. Distribution of turns in Plato’s Meno over the four interlocutors
(Socrate, Meno, Boy and Anytus)
Plato’s Meno is different in that it has four interlocutors. The pat-
tern is, however, still one of alternating turns. The person taking
turns throughout the dialogue is Socrates. He has three interlocu-
tors (Meno, Boy, and Anytus) – Plato has conversations with one at
a time, hence in Figure 3 half of the turns are Plato’s.
3.1 Meno (Plato)
In this dialogue, the concept of virtue is examined. Its principal inter-
locutors are Socrates and Meno, a young man from one of Thessaly’s
leading families. Meno is interested in the question whether virtue
can be taught, is the result of practice, or neither. Socrates challenges
Meno to first tell him what he thinks virtue is. Meno makes several at-
tempts, but every time Socrates points out that his characterizations
do not provide a proper definition of virtue. Socrates’s arguments
draw on analogies – for example, he criticizes Meno for trying to
define virtue by describing individual virtues. Socrates likens this to
characterizing the nature of bees by listing several kinds of bee, and
gets Meno to agree that it does not result in a satisfactory definition.
The discussion then moves on to how an inquiry, such as the cur-
rent one, can lead to knowledge: Socrates puts forward the claim that
any learning that takes place occurs through recollection of knowl-
edge that the interlocutors already possessed. He then supports this
claim by having a conversation with Meno’s slave boy in which he
purports to demonstrate that without teaching the boy, he can make
him recollect some facts of elementary geometry: ‘Do you observe,
Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him
questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is nec-
essary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?
Yes.’
Finally, the discussion returns to the question whether virtue can
be taught, and Socrates proposes to proceed by hypothesis, in partic-
ular, the hypothesis that virtue is a kind of knowledge. Eventually, he
concludes against this and proposes virtue may rather be a gift from
the gods, the gift of right opinion: ‘But if not by knowledge, the only
alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states
by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion;
for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know
not what they say.’
We established that in all five dialogues considered here, the in-
terlocutors take alternating turns. This does, however, not give us the
full picture of how dominant each of the interlocutors is. For this
purpose, information on the length of turns for each interlocutor is
useful, where length as the number of words that a turn consists of.
In Figure 4, we provide information on this for each interlocutor in
Plato’s Meno. We have grouped turns of certain length together: 0–
5, 6–10, 11–20, 21–30, 31–40, 41–50, 51–100, 101–200, 201–300,
301–400, 401–500, 501–600, 601–700. In order to fit all information
in one bar chart, the groupings get larger (at 11, 51 and 101), starting
with 0–5 and ending with 601–700. For each interlocutor, the chart
depicts what percentage of an interlocutor’s turns fall into a certain
grouping.
Figure 4. Percentage of turns grouped by length of turns for Plato’s Meno
dialogue
From Figure 4 it is apparent that Socrates is the dominant speaker.
The majority of turns for each of Anytus, Boy and Meno are in the
0–5 group. Socrates, in contrast, peaks at 11-20 and his turns spread
out more equally among the groups, with a substantial proportion of
his turns in the 51-100 group, and some even in the group of turns
with between 301 and 400 words.
These data give a very different view of the dialogue than the one
that Socrates wants us to accept. We already pointed out that Socrates
tries to suggest that his role in the dialogue is one of helping the other
interlocutor recollect knowledge. This is, however, not quite the story
that our quantitative data tell us. If we zoom in on our data for the
boy, this becomes even more apparent: 63% of the boy’s turns are of
length 1, 21% of length 2, 6% of length 3, 6% of length 4, and, finally,
4% of length 6. Examining the boy’s turns even more closely, each
falls into one of three categories: an affirmation of an assertion that
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was formulated as a question (e.g., ‘And are there not these four di-
visions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?
– True.’), an answer a WH-question (e.g., ‘But how much? – Four
times as much.’), and the response ‘I do not understand’. Now, 73%
of the boy’s turns are affirmations (‘I do’, ‘there are’, ‘It ought’, ‘that
is evident’, ‘very good’, ‘certainly, Socrates’, etc.), 25% are answers
to genuine WH-questions, and there is one instance of the response ‘I
do not know’. These data call into to question the rather strong claim
that Socrates seeks confirmation for at the end of this interaction:
(3) Socr: And that is the line which the learned
call the diagonal. And if this is the
proper name, then you, Meno’s slave,
are prepared to affirm that the double
space is the square of the diagonal?
Boy: Certainly, Socrates.
Socr: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all
these answers given out of his own head?
Meno: Yes, they were all his own.
3.2 A Merry Dialogue (Erasmus)
This dialogue features Eulalia and Xantippa, the latter named after
the wife of Socrates and prototype of shrews in literature. Eulalia
provides Xantippa with advice on how deal with her unfavourably
portrayed husband. As can be seen in Figure 5, Erasmus’s dialogue is
different from Plato’s in that in Erasmus’s dialogue the interlocutors
are more each others’ equals: the distribution of their turns over the
various length matches up quite neatly, though Eulalia has a slight
advantage when it comes to the extremely long turns (>100). Most
of the points in this dialogue are made by the interlocutors sharing
stories of wives. The dialogue contains very little direct argument (as
introduced by WHY-questions such as ‘Why say ye so. I pray you,
are you at oddes now.’). Erasmus does, however, seem to use the
dialogue as a whole to present and argue by example for his views
on how a wife should behave.
Figure 5. Percentage of turns grouped by length of turns for Erasmus’s
dialogue
3.3 What is Man? (Twain)
Twain’s dialogue between an Old Man and a Young Man concerns
the proposition proposed by the Old Man that man is merely a
machine and nothing more. The Old Man plays a similar role to
that of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues. He leads the dialogue, intro-
ducing thought experiments, arguments and rebuttals of the Young
Man’s objections. The fact that the Old Man leads the dialogue is
reflected in the quantitave information regarding turn length in Fig-
ure 6: whereas about 40% of the Young Man’s turns are short ones
(0–5), only about 20 % of the Old Man’s turns belong to this group.
Whereas they are roughly equal for groups 6–10, 11-20 and 21–30,
for all subsequent groups (from 41–50 to 601–700), the Old Man’s
proportion of turns is larger than the Young Man’s.
Figure 6. Percentage of turns grouped by length of turns for Twain’s What
is man? dialogue
3.4 Holes (Lewis and Lewis)
This dialogue pits a materialist nominalist (Argle) againts a realist
(Bargle) regarding the existence of holes:
(4) Argle: I believe in nothing but concrete material objects.
Bargle: [..] Every time you get started on any such topic,
I know we are in for a long argument. [...]
[..]
Bargle: A long evening’s work. Before we start, let me find
you a snack. Will you have some crackers and cheese?
Argle: Thank you. What spendid Gruyere.





Argle seems somewhat at a disadvantage in Figure 7, with a higher
proportion of short turns (0–5 and 11–20). However, Argle has an
edge over Bargle when we compare very long turns (101-200 and
201–300). In this dialogue, it is Argle who puts forward certain
claims – at first that ‘holes are fictions’ and later when made to
retreat on that point that ‘the hole-lining is the hole’ – and Bargle
questions these claims by presenting examples that appear to con-
tradict Argle’s claims. In this respect, the dialogue resembles Plato’s
Meno. The difference, however, is that Argle, as opposed to the char-
acter Meno, does get much more of a chance to put forward his po-
sition. Moreover, in this dialogue neither Argle nor Bargle gains a
clear upperhand at the end. The purpose of the dialogue is made ex-
plicit when they conclude that ‘Argle: We agree in principle; we’re
only haggling. Bargle: We do. And the same is true of our other de-
bates over ontic parsimony. Indeed, this argument has served us as
an illustration—novel, simple, and self-contained—of the nature of
our customary disputes. Argle: And yet the illustration has interest
in its own right. Your holes, had I been less successful, would have
punctured my nominalistic materialism with the greatest of ease.’
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Figure 7. Percentage of turns grouped by length of turns for Lewis and
Lewis’s Holes dialogue
3.5 Is God a Taoist? (Smullyan)
God and a mortal discuss the problem of free will. The mortal asks
God to be absolved of free will in order to avoid sinful behaviour,
and God challenges the logic behind this request. The profile of this
dialogue (Figure 8) resembles Plato’s Meno, with God playing the
Socratic role, having a lower proportion of short and higher propor-
tion of long turns in comparison with the mortal.
Figure 8. Percentage of turns grouped by length of turns for Smullyan’s Is
God a Taoist? dialogue
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main purpose of this paper has been to draw attention to fic-
tive dialogue as a natural means for presenting arguments. Automatic
generation of such dialogue is a Natural Language Generation task,
not unlike other presentation tasks in the area of computational mod-
els of natural argument [12]. We propose that a good starting point
for this line of work is the close study of human-authored fictive
dialogue. Our preliminary efforts were directed at both qualitative
and quantitative properties of such dialogues. Most interesting from a
qualitative perspective were, in our view, the fact that authors exploit
dramatic elements in argumentative dialogue (Twain), and use dia-
logue not just as a vehicle for expressing arguments, but also as way
to vividly present thought experiments/claims (Plato, Twain, Lewis
and Lewis). We believe that further study of human-authored fictive
dialogue can lead to a typology of dialogue structures that express
arguments vividly, linking known argument structures in monologue
to patterns in fictive dialogue. Such a typology could then be used to
inform automated mappings from argument in monologue to argu-
ment in dialogue form. Current work on mapping text in monologue
form to dialogue (e.g., Piwek et al. [8]) is based on hand-crafted,
rather than empirically motivated, mapping rules. In particular, the
output dialogue structures are not based directly on patterns found in
human-authored dialogues. Further exploration and analysis of the
current corpus of dialogues could address this issue.
We saw that from a quantitative point of view, Plato’s Meno is
quite extreme: with one clear lead participant being priviledged with
the longer turns in the dialogue. There is much further work to be
done, notably, we need to go beyond counting turns and length of
turns and analyse the dialogues in more detail in terms of their di-
alogue acts, and repeat the current studies for further dialogues by
the same authors. The latter could help us make more general claims
about the dialogue style of these authors. This in turn could feed into
work on automated dialogue generation. For example, the number of
turns and length of turns for each interlocutor could be viewed as
global constraints expressing the style of a particular author, and be
used for automated generation of fictive dialogue – possibly in Pi-
wek and Van Deemter’s [9] constraint and revision-based dialogue
generation architecture.
In conclusion, there are many open issues and questions to be an-
swered, and yet we hope to have convinced the reader that presen-
tation of arguments as fictive dialogues is a fruitful area for further
research and that corpus-based approaches such as the current one
provide a helpful starting point for such work.
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